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This paper examines the impacts of access to extension services and cooperative membership on
technology adoption, asset ownership and poverty using household-level data from rural Nigeria. Using
different matching techniques and endogenous switching regression approach, we ﬁnd that both
extension access and cooperative membership have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect on
technology adoption and household welfare. Moreover, we ﬁnd that both extension access and coop-
erative membership have heterogeneous impacts. In particular, we ﬁnd evidence of a positive selection
as the average treatment effects of extension access and cooperative membership are higher for farmers
with the highest propensity to access extension and cooperative services. The impact of extension ser-
vices on poverty reduction and of cooperatives on technology adoption is signiﬁcantly stronger for
smallholders with access to formal credit than for those without access. This implies that expanding rural
ﬁnancial markets can maximize the potential positive impacts of extension and cooperative services on
farmers’ productivity and welfare.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Adoption of improved agricultural technologies by smallholders
is considered as the main pathway for breaking poverty trap.
Applied correctly, adoption should, ceteris paribus, increase pro-
ductivity and provide additional income to farmers. In this way,
technology adoption can accelerate economic growth, create mar-
keting opportunities, and help millions of farmers to move out of
poverty. However, adoption rates for improved agricultural tech-
nologies have been rather disappointing and far from complete and
proper identiﬁcation of the main barriers of adoption remains a
challenge (Shiferaw et al., 2008; Solomon et al., 2010;Wossen et al.,Ltd. This is an open access article2015). Major identiﬁed causes of lowadoption rates include supply-
side constraints such as imperfect information and credit markets
(Shiferaw et al., 2008; Suri, 2011; Wossen et al., 2015). Addressing
information market imperfections can therefore serve as an
important entry point for increasing adoption of agricultural
technologies.
This paper focuses on extension access and cooperative mem-
bership which are key supply-side policy instruments to inﬂuence
agricultural productivity in developing countries. Access to exten-
sion service enhances the adoption of improved agricultural tech-
nologies by reducing supply-side constraints that arise due to
information market inefﬁciencies (Wossen et al., 2015). In partic-
ular, extension access facilitates adoption by exposing farmers to
new technologies and by educating them about best farming and
management practices (Anderson and Feder, 2007; Wossen et al.,
2013). In addition to its direct effect on adoption, access tounder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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gap between potential and actual yields (Anderson and Feder,
2007). However, extension access may also hinder adoption if
extension workers exclude the poorest farmers or if they lack both
the incentive and accountability needed to transfer reliable and
timely information to smallholders (Davis, 2008; Jack, 2011).
Although extension networks have been cited as the primary ways
through which researchers and policymakers promote new and
improved agricultural technologies, the evidence for their impact
on adoption and welfare is rather mixed (Anderson and Feder,
2007; Davis et al., 2012).
The other well-documented constraint to the adoption of agri-
cultural technologies is related to market inefﬁciencies, ﬁnancial as
well as input and output markets. In response to these market-
related barriers, several farmer-controlled cooperatives have
emerged in rural areas (Latynskiy and Berger, 2016). Cooperatives
are widely regarded as an important institutional innovation that
can help overcome the constraints that impede smallholders’ ac-
cess tomarket (Abebaw and Haile, 2013; Verhofstadt andMaertens,
2014; Ma and Abdulai, 2016). There are many pathways through
which cooperatives may affect technology adoption and welfare.
First, cooperatives can relax the liquidity constraint that farmers
face by providing credit for members. Secondly, cooperatives affect
adoption and welfare by providing market information and, thirdly,
by potentially offering a better market price for their produce.
Finally, by pooling different resources such as credit, information,
and labour among members, cooperatives can create economies of
scale and hence improve welfare.
Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to examine the impact of
extension access and cooperative membership not only on adop-
tion of improved agricultural technologies but also on household
welfare outcomes. Whereas adoption of improved cassava varieties
serves as a measure of the adoption of agricultural technology, we
use asset ownership, consumption expenditure, and the progress
out of poverty index (PPI) as a measure of welfare outcomes.
Evaluating the impact of extension access and cooperative mem-
bership on technology adoption and welfare outcomes is nontrivial
as in other social programs, because of endogenous program
placements. We therefore employed alternative econometric
techniques including propensity score matching and endogenous
switching regression methods to address the endogeneity bias
problem. By focusing on a country that heavily relies on cassava,
this paper uses empirical data to identify the causal effects of access
to extension and cooperative services on the adoption of improved
cassava varieties and household welfare. In doing so, the study pro-
vides not only new evidence on the impacts of extension access and
cooperative membership on welfare outcomes but also on the
heterogeneous treatment effects of such interventions. To the au-
thors' knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to provide a comprehensive
assessment of extension access and cooperative membership ef-
fects on adoption and welfare outcomes in the context of Nigeria.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
provides background information on the evolution of extension
services and cooperatives and reviews the literature on the impacts
of extension access and cooperative membership on technology
adoption and household welfare. Section 3 presents data sources
and the econometric strategy used for the empirical analysis. Sec-
tion 4 presents the ﬁndings and discusses the results. Section 5
concludes the study, provides a list of open questions and dis-
cusses further research.
2. Context and related literature
Our study focuses on cassava production in Nigeria, the largest
cassava producer in the world. Cassava is the most widelycultivated root crop in terms of area allocation and has the largest
number of growers (FMANR, 2010; Abdoulaye et al., 2013). Cassava
has been increasing in importance in recent years and is fast
replacing yam and other traditional staple foods as a famine reserve
and insurance crop against hunger (FAO and IFAD, 2005; FMANR,
2010). The crop is important not only as a food but also as a ma-
jor source of income for rural households. As a cash crop, cassava
generates income for the largest number of households compared
with other staples (FAO and IFAD, 2005; FMANR, 2010); this jus-
tiﬁes our focus on the crop. Improving agricultural productivity - in
particular, cassava productivity - through an efﬁcient extension
advisory service is therefore central for poverty reduction efforts in
Nigeria. Cognizant of this fact, different approaches and systems for
extension service delivery have been implemented in an attempt to
improve productivity and reduce rural poverty. For instance, until
the late 1960s the extension service mainly targeted exportable
commodities. However, this approach was reversed in the 1980s
when the focus shifted towards food self-sufﬁciency as part of the
Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs) program. This approach
gave special attention to training and visit (T&V) that was favoured
by many donors including the World Bank (FMARD, 2014). The
services provided by ADPs include establishing demonstration
farms; identifying lead farmers and providing them with infor-
mation about improved farming practices; facilitating access to
improved technology and inputs, such as improved seed varieties,
fertilizer, crop chemicals and machinery services and helping lead
farmers to train other farmers (Mogues et al., 2012). To date, T&V is
still the dominant extension service delivery approach in Nigeria,
albeit with some modiﬁcations and blending with participatory
approaches by several NGOs in the agricultural sector (FMARD,
2014).
With the aim of improving the effectiveness and efﬁciency of
the extension service, a policy of a Uniﬁed Agricultural Extension
Service (UAES) was implemented in 1991. This program aimed at
providing an 'efﬁcient extension service through a single extension
agent covering the whole farming system in a holistic manner.
From 2008 onwards, the Government again revised the extension
policy as part of the National Food Security Program (NFSP) to
further improve efﬁciency through information and interventions
based on communication technology (ICT) (FMARD, 2014). The new
extension systemwas aimed at transforming agricultural extension
service into a participatory, demand-driven, market-oriented, and
ICT-driven service (FMARD, 2014).
In the context of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the role that exten-
sion access plays in technology transfer and household welfare has
received considerable attention (Anderson and Feder, 2007; Davis,
2008; Davis et al., 2012). Empirical evidence has shown that
institutional arrangements and public investment that improve
agricultural extension play a crucial role in facilitating technology
transfer for rural poor farmers (Anderson and Feder, 2007; Davis,
2008; Dercon et al., 2009; Ito et al., 2012). For instance, Owens
et al. (2003) reported a 15% gain in crop productivity due to
extension access in rural Zimbabwe. Similarly, Dercon et al. (2009)
showed that agricultural extension improved household welfare by
reducing the incidence of poverty in rural Ethiopia. Their study
highlighted the fact that receiving at least one extension visit
reduced the incidence of poverty by 10 percentage points and
increased consumption growth by 7 percentage points. In the
context of Nigeria, Abdoulaye et al. (2013) found that farmers’
proximity to change agents resulted in a higher level of awareness
and the use of improved technologies. Similarly, Sodiya et al. (2007)
reported a positive relationship between extension access and
adoption of improved cassava varieties in Nigeria. Despite a
plethora of empirical evidence on the effects of extension access in
many developing countries, a comprehensive assessment of the
1 The ten questions used for constructing the PPI for Nigeria are available online
here: http://www.progressoutofpoverty.org/ppi-users.
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welfare is almost non-existent in the context of Nigeria.
Another important area of research in SSA is the role that rural
producer organizations and agricultural cooperatives play for
technology adoption and household welfare. In Nigeria, the history
of cooperatives goes back to 1926 when the cocoa farmers formed a
small union to sell their production. They emerged as a self-help
group in response to local-level credit market imperfections. Ru-
ral producer organizations and cooperatives have long been studied
in relation to transaction costs and collective action problems
(Gabre-Madhin, 2001; Shiferaw et al.,2008; Bernard, 2009; Bernard
and Taffesse, 2012; Ragasa and Golan, 2014), with particular in-
terest in its application in developing countries (Ito et al., 2012;
Abebaw and Haile, 2013; Latynskiy and Berger, 2016). Empirical
evidence from many developing countries shows that agricultural
cooperatives play a crucial role for technology adoption in the
presence of high transaction costs and low bargaining power
(Abebaw and Haile, 2013; Abdoulaye et al., 2013; Ma and Abdulai,
2016). In the context of SSA, cooperatives have been widely dis-
cussed in terms of improving market bargaining power (Shiferaw
and Hellin, 2011; Abdoulaye et al., 2013; Latynskiy and Berger,
2016) and in facilitating risk-sharing (Shiferaw et al., 2008). In a
study that assessed the role of cooperative membership on farmers'
uptake of innovations, Kolade and Harpha (2014) eported that
cooperative membership exerts a direct inﬂuence on adoption of
innovations. Similarly, Gebremichael (2014) found that cooperative
membership improves technology adoption and food security,
especially for rural women. Their result suggests that cooperative
membership helps households to diversify their livelihoods, pro-
vides opportunities to reduce transactional costs, improves market
bargaining power and promotes opportunities for gender equity. In
the context of Ethiopia, Abebaw and Haile (2013) reported a strong
positive impact of cooperative membership on fertilizer adoption.
Similarly, in their analysis of cooperative membership in rural
China, Ma and Abdulai (2016) found a positive and signiﬁcant
impact of cooperative membership on apple yields, net returns, and
household income.
However, cooperatives may impose costs on poor members in
the form of compulsory regular membership fees. This is particu-
larly the situation when farmers join cooperatives owing to social
pressure instead of pure economic beneﬁts. In addition, co-
operatives may exclude disadvantaged groups and the poorest
farmers. While it is increasingly clear that informal cooperatives
can affect adoption decisions and welfare levels, it is likely to be
heavily contingent on the speciﬁc technology, the type of resources
required for getting access to it, and the socio-economic charac-
teristics of members (Ito et al., 2012; Abebaw and Haile, 2013;
Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014; Latynskiy and Berger, 2016; Ma
and Abdulai, 2016).
3. Data and methods
3.1. Data source and outcome indicators
The data for this study were obtained from the Cassava Moni-
toring Survey for Nigeria (CMS), which was designed to assess the
adoption of improved cassava cultivars. The data were collected
through a household survey from 2500 randomly selected cassava-
growing households in the major cassava-growing States that
together account for over 80% of the annual total production. The
survey contains detailed information on a range of socio-economic
attributes, asset holdings, poverty measures, adoption of improved
cassava varieties, membership of formal and informal associations
as well as access to credit and extension, among others. Since the
focus is on welfare impacts of cooperative membership andextension access, we used PPI, asset ownership and consumption
expenditure as a measure of welfare.
Our ﬁrst welfare measure-PPI is introduced by the Grameen
foundation with the speciﬁc aim of measuring poverty at the
household level based on observable household characteristics,
asset ownership and access to basic services (Desiere et al., 2015).
PPI is constructed based on ten questions that are correlated with
poverty and is widely used by many projects in many developing
countries.1 The PPI indicator for Nigeria is based on data from the
2003/4 National Living Standards Survey (NLSS). Each question has
a weight that helps to identify the likelihood that the household is
living below the poverty line. All points in the scorecard are non-
negative integers and the total score ranges from 0 (most likely to
be below a poverty line) to 100 (least likely to be below a poverty
line).
Our secondwelfare indicator is asset ownership. The use of asset
ownership as a welfare indicator has two advantages. First, as
argued by Carter and Barrett (2006), asset-based outcome in-
dicators are forward-looking unlike indicators based on expendi-
ture and income (i.e., asset based indicators show whether
households are likely to remain poor into the future). As such, the
use of asset ownership indicators enables us to address questions
surrounding households’ longer-term prospects of being non-poor
(Carter and Barrett, 2006). We therefore use the monetary value of
productive assets (such as farm equipment), household assets (such
as ownership of mobile phones and television sets) and durable
assets (such as jewellery and household utensils) as a measure of
asset value. Secondly, our asset-based outcome indicator can be
used as a robustness check for our ﬁrst preferred indicator, PPI
score. Because PPI score accounts for household assets, we expect
extension access and cooperative membership to have similar ef-
fects on PPI and asset ownership. The third outcome indicator we
employ in this study is per-capita food consumption expenditure.
Our intermediary outcome indicator, that is, adoption of improved
cassava varieties, is measured by a dummy variable which takes a
value of one if a household grows improved cassava varieties, and
zero otherwise.3.2. Empirical strategy
Identiﬁcation of the causal effects of extension access and
cooperative membership on potential outcome indicators is not
trivial due to endogeneity bias. Accurate measurement of impacts
requires controlling for both observable and unobservable charac-
teristics through random assignment of individuals into treat-
ments. In the absence of random assignments, selection bias may
persist as observed and unobserved characteristics of individuals
may affect the likelihood of receiving treatments as well as
outcome indicators. In this paper, we employ propensity score
matching (PSM), inverse probability weighted adjusted regression
(IPWRA) and endogenous switching regression (ESR) approaches to
control for endogeneity bias. The basic idea behind PSM is to match
each treated household with a similar untreated household and
then measure the average difference in the outcome variable be-
tween the treated and untreated households. In other words, we
are interested in the question, “How would the welfare level of
households have changed had the treated households chosen not to be
in the treatment group?” Following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009),
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is deﬁned as:
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where Yð1Þ and Yð0Þ are outcome indicators (in our case, welfare
and adoption level of treated and untreated households, respec-
tively). T is a treatment indicator. However, we can only observe
E½Yð1ÞjT ¼ 1 in our data set and E½Yð0ÞjT ¼ 1 is missing. In essence,
we cannot observe the welfare and adoption level of treated
households had they not been treated, once they are treated.
Simple comparison of adoption and welfare level of farmers with
and without treatment status introduces bias in estimated impacts
due to self-selection bias. The magnitude of self-selection bias is
formally presented as:
E½Yð1Þ  Yð0ÞjT ¼ 1 ¼ ATTþ E½Yð0ÞjT ¼ 1 Yð0ÞjT ¼ 0 (2)
By creating comparable counterfactual households for treated
households, PSM reduces the bias due to observables. Once
households are matched with observables, PSM assumes that there
are no systematic differences in unobservable characteristics be-
tween treated and untreated households. Given this assumption of
conditional independence and the overlap conditions, ATT is
computed as follows:
ATT ¼ E½Yð1ÞjT ¼ 1; pðxÞ  E½Yð0ÞjT ¼ 0;pðxÞ (3)
However, ATT from PSM can still produce biased results in the
presence ofmis-speciﬁcation in the propensity scoremodel (Robins
et al., 2007; Wooldridge, 2007, 2010). A potential remedy for such
misspeciﬁcation bias is to use IPWRA. According to Wooldridge
(2010), IPWRA estimates will be consistent in the presence of
mis-speciﬁcation in the treatment/outcomemodel, but not both. As
a result, the IPWRA estimator has the double-robust property that
ensures consistent results as it allows the outcome and the treat-
mentmodel to account for mis-speciﬁcation. Following Imbens and
Wooldridge (2009), ATT in the IPWRA model is estimated in two
steps. Suppose that the outcome model is represented by a linear
regression function of the form Yi ¼ ai þ 4ixi þ εi for i ¼ ½0 1 and
the propensity scores are given by pðx;gÞ: In the ﬁrst step, we es-
timate the propensity scores as pðx; bgÞ: In the second step, we then
employ linear regression to estimate ða0; 40Þ and ða1; 41Þ using
inverse probability weighted least squares as
min
a0; 40
XN
i
ðYi  a0  40xiÞ=pðx; bgÞ if Ti ¼ 0 (4)
min
a1; 41
XN
i
ðYi  a1  41xiÞ=pðx; bgÞ if Ti ¼ 1 (5)
The ATT is then computed as the difference between Eq. (4) and
Eq. (5).
ATT ¼ 1
Nw
XNw
i
½ðba1  ba0Þ  ðb41  b40Þxi  (6)
where, ðba1; b41Þ are estimated inverse probability weighted pa-
rameters for treated households while ðba0; b40Þ are estimated in-
verse probability weighted parameters for untreated households.
Finally, Nw stands for the total number of treated households.
However, matching techniques-regardless of adjustments for
misspeciﬁcation bias-can overcome only the selection bias caused
by observables. When the cause of endogeneity bias is unobserv-
able heterogeneity, such as farmer's inherent skill, results based onmatching techniques will be biased. We, therefore, employed an
ESRmodel that accounts for both observed and unobserved sources
of bias (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004; Shiferaw et al., 2014; Ma and
Abdulai, 2016). The ESR approach addresses this endogeneity
problem by estimating the selection and outcome equations
simultaneously using the full information maximum likelihood
(FIML) (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004; Ma and Abdulai, 2016). We as-
sume that a particular farm household would consider receiving a
treatment if the expected beneﬁt of the treatment (in terms of
welfare gain) is positive. Let w0 be the welfare level of households
without treatment (that is, without extension access or cooperative
membership), and let w1 be the corresponding welfare level with
treatment (with extension access or cooperative membership). The
farmer will choose to be in the treatment, if the welfare gain
deﬁned as, Y*i ¼ w1 w0; is positive. However, the welfare gain
that the farmer derives from treatment ðY*i Þ is a latent variable
determined by observed characteristics ðZiÞ as follows:
Yi ¼ b0 þ gZi þ mi with Ti ¼

1 if Yi >0
0 if Yi  0
(7)
The vector Z represents variables that affect the expected ben-
eﬁts from having extension access and being a member of co-
operatives. The outcome function conditional on treatment can
then be speciﬁed as ESR model in the following manner.
Regime1 : Y1i ¼ g1x1i þ ε1i if Ti ¼ 1 (8)
Regime 2 : Y2i ¼ g2x2i þ ε2i if Ti ¼ 0 (9)
where, Y1i represents the outcome indicator of treated households
and Y2i of untreated households while xi represents a vector of
exogenous variables. εi is the error term of the outcome variable.
The error terms in the selection Eq. (7) and the outcome Eqs. (8)
and (9) are assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution with
mean zero and covariance matrix ð UÞ in the following manner:
U ¼
2
64 s
2
u s1m s2m
s1m s
2
1 :
s2m : s
2
2
3
75
where s2u ¼ varðmiÞ; s21 ¼ varð ε1Þ; s22 ¼ varð ε2Þ; s1m ¼ covðmi; ε1Þ;
s2m ¼ covðmi; ε2Þ Furthermore, s2u is estimable up to a scale factor
and can be assumed to be equal to 1 (Maddalla, 1983) and
covð ε1; ε2Þ is not deﬁned as Y1 and Y2 cannot be observed
simultaneously. Moreover, the correlation between the error term
of the selection equation and the outcome equation is not zero (i.e.,
corrðmi; ε1Þs0 & corrðmi; ε2Þs0) which creates selection bias.
ESR addresses this selection bias by estimating the inverse mills
ratios ðl1i and l2iÞ and the covariance terms ðs1m and s2mÞ and
including them as auxiliary regressors in Eqs. (8) and (9). If s1m and
s2m are signiﬁcant, we reject the absence of selection bias. In
addition, s1m <0 represents positive selection bias (i.e., households
with above-average outcomes are more likely to choose to be in the
treatment). The ESR model estimates can then be used to estimate
ATTand ATU (Average treatment effect on untreated households) as
follows:
EðY1ij Ti ¼ 1Þ ¼ g1x1i þ l1is1m (10)
EðY2ij Ti ¼ 0Þ ¼ g2x2i þ l2is2m (11)
Table 1
Descriptive statistics by treatment.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 Mean
diff
Mean
diff
Total sample
(N ¼ 2190)a
With extension
(N ¼ 920)
Without extension
(N ¼ 1490)
Members of cooperatives
(N ¼ 602)
Non-members
(N ¼ 1808)
(2e3) (4e5)
Mean Mean Mean Mean
PPI Index 59.9 65.3 56.5 64.9 58.3 8.8*** 6.7***
Log of asset value 4.77 5.04 4.6 5.18 4.64 0.44*** 0.54***
Log per-capita food
expenditure
11.62 11.66 11.59 11.64 11.62 0.066* 0.02
Adoption 0.597 0.74 0.51 0.71 0.56 0.23*** 0.15***
Household size (Family
size in numbers)
4.5 4.69 4.38 4.8 4.4 0.31*** 0.4***
Age (Age of the
household head in
years)
51 50.7 51.2 51.22 50.92 0.5 0.3
Sex of the household
head (1 ¼ male)
0.89 0.92 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.05*** 0.01
Marital status
(1 ¼ married)
0.88 0.92 0.86 0.90 0.88 0.06*** 0.02
Education (years of
schooling)
8.8 9.4 8.4 9.9 8.4 1.00*** 1.5***
Total farm size (ha) 2.93 3.45 2.62 3.34 2.8 0.83*** 0.54***
Livestock ownership
(TLUb)
0.60 0.923 0.407 1.43 0.33 0.516 1.1**
Access to credit
(1 ¼ yes,
0 ¼ otherwise)
0.434 0.54 0.37 0.61 0.37 0.17*** 0.24***
Use of chemical
fertilizer
0.36 0.32 0.38 0.362 0.359 0.06*** 0.003
Distance from fertilizer
dealer (km)
11.98 12.1 11.9 11.75 12.1 0.2 0.26
Distance from herbicide
dealer (km)
11.68 11.21 11.98 11.6 11.7 0.77 0.1
Presence of private
processors (1 ¼ yes,
0 ¼ otherwise)
0.17 0.258 0.111 0.299 0.124 0.147*** 0.174***
Mobile phone coverage
(1 ¼ yes,
0 ¼ otherwise)
0.88 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.19 0.01
a The total sample size in the study was about 2500. However, our ﬁnal sample is 2190 due to missing values for expenditure and other controls.
b Note: TLU ¼ Tropical Livestock Unit.
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EðY1ij Ti ¼ 0Þ ¼ g1x2i þ l2is1m (13)
The ATT is then deﬁned as the difference between Eqs. (10
&12).2
ATT ¼ EðY1ij Ti ¼ 1Þ  EðY2ij Ti ¼ 1Þ
¼ x1iðg1  g2Þ þ l1i

s1m  s2m
 (14)
Identiﬁcation of the ESR model requires at least one additional
variable as an instrument in Eq. (7) (that is, a variable that is
correlated with the treatment status but not with outcome in-
dicators). The challenge in our identiﬁcation strategy is therefore to
ﬁnd a variable that directly affects the choice into treatment but not
the outcome indicators. Following the literature (see, Alene and
Manyong, 2007; Shiferaw et al., 2014), we used an indicator vari-
able for the presence of private local cassava processors as a potential
instrument for cooperative membership and village-level variables
for extension access. In particular, we used village-level penetration2 The difference between Eqs. (11) and (13) represents ATU.rates of mobile phone coverage as an identifying instrument.
Village-level mobile phone coverage is arguably beyond the
households’ own decision.3.3. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables of
interest. The data show that about 60% of farmers have adopted
improved cassava varieties. However, the intensity of adoption is
only 38%. The average household size is about 4.5 members and the
average household head is 51 years old (Table 1). Moreover, most of
the respondents are literate, with an average of 9 years of schooling
for the household head. About 89% of household heads are male
and 88% are married. Smallholder farmers are located on average
12 km away from a nearby fertilizer dealer and 11.7 km away from
herbicide dealers. In terms of the treatment variables, the data
show that about 24.5% of farm households are cooperative mem-
bers while 39% are reported to have access to extension.
Table 1 further presents the difference in means (of all cova-
riates) between farmers with and without extension access as well
as between cooperative members and non-members. The mean
differences are statistically signiﬁcant for all our outcome in-
dicators. For instance, about 74% of households with extension
Table 2
Determinants of access to extension and membership of cooperatives.
Variables Access to extension Cooperative membership
Household size 0.008 0.029**
(0.015) (0.015)
Age 0.029* 0.003
(0.015) (0.015)
Age^ 2 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.018** 0.030***
(0.007) (0.007)
Marital status 0.044 0.063
(0.133) (0.123)
Sex 0.162 0.139
(0.134) (0.125)
TLU 0.002 0.006*
(0.003) (0.003)
Land size 0.023** 0.023**
(0.010) (0.010)
Access to credit 0.317*** 0.354***
(0.083) (0.073)
Distance from fertilizer dealer 0.007** 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Use of chemical fertilizer 0.082 0.064
(0.075) (0.071)
Distance from herbicide dealer 0.006* 0.001
(0.003) (0.004)
Mobile phone coverage 1.461***
(0.158)
Presence of private cassava processor 0.516***
(0.080)
N 2190 2190
Note: Standard errors clustered at enumeration level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively. Controls included in the regression but not reported here include: village dummies, and dummies for road qualities.
Table 3
Effect of extension access and cooperative membership on adoption and welfare
outcomes.
Variables Extension access Cooperative membership
PSM IPWRA ESR PSM IPWRA ESR
1 2 3 4 5 6
PPI score 10.45*** 10.26*** 10.74*** 4.57*** 5.98*** 9.01***
(1.07) (0.78) (0.301) (1.29) (0.89) (0.317)
Adoption 0.155*** 0.207*** 0.123*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.137***
(0.029) (0.022) (0.004) (0.034) (0.024) (0.005)
Log of asset value 0.275*** 0.30*** 0.467*** 0.292*** 0.34*** 0.96***
(0.096) (0.074) (0.0145) (0.113) (0.084) (0.016)
Food expenditure 0.157*** 0.095*** 0.256*** 0.052 0.077** 0.125***
(0.051) (0.034) (0.013) (0.054) (0.037) (0.009)
N 2090 2090 2090 2090 2090 2090
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Village dummies were
included but not reported here.
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farmers without extension access adopted improved cassava vari-
eties. The difference in the mean adoption rate between the two
groups is statistically signiﬁcant at 1%. On average, households with
extension access own more land, have better credit and market
access and tend to be wealthier than those without access.
Surprisingly, farmers with access to extension tend to use less
chemical fertilizer than households without extension access.
Similarly, about 72% of cooperative members and only 56% of non-
members adopted improved cassava varieties. This difference is
also statistically signiﬁcant at 1%. In addition, cooperative members
tend to be better educated, have larger household size, farm size,
and more assets (measured by ownership of livestock wealth), and
have better credit access. Farm households with extension access
have signiﬁcantly higher asset values and PPI scores than those
without extension access.
Similarly, cooperative members have better asset values and PPI
scores compared to non-members. However, as stated earlier, the
results in Table 1 cannot be used to make inferences regarding the
impacts of access to extension services and cooperative member-
ship on poverty and welfare or technology adoption without con-
trolling for other confounding factors.3 Note that, determinants of extension access and cooperative membership can
directly be estimated from the ESR selection equation. However, due to space
limitation, we were able to include only some selected results. These selected ESR
results are reported in Tables 7 and 8 in the appendix. The full results are available
upon request.4. Results
4.1. Determinants of extension access and cooperative membership
Table 2 presents the main determinants of extension access and
cooperative membership.3 The results show that extension access
is strongly associated with the socio-economic and demographic
characteristics of households. In particular, older and more
educated households are more likely to seek extension services.
Farm size has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect on the
probability of receiving extension services, implying that extension
agents are more likely to target smallholders. Similarly, households
Fig. 1. Common support region for extension access.
Fig. 2. Propensity score distribution and common support for cooperative
membership.
Table 4
Propensity score matching quality test.
Extension access Cooperative membership
Pseudo R2 before matching 0.044 0.061
Pseudo R2 after matching 0.004 0.01
LRc2 (p-value) before matching 123.87 (p>c2 ¼ 0.000) 142.99 (p>c2 ¼ 0.000)
LRc2 (p-value) after matching 8.17 (p>c2 ¼ 0.698) 15.06 (p>c2 ¼ 0.238)
Mean standardized bias before matching 13.6 11.5
Mean standardized bias after matching 2.8 6.0
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vices. Regarding the determinants of cooperative membership,
farm households with larger land sizes andmore livestock units are
more likely to become cooperative members. Education has a
positive and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient, indicating that
literate households are more likely to join cooperatives. Coopera-
tive members are also more likely to have access to credit as the
effect of credit access is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Inaddition, Table 2 presents results on the relevance of our in-
struments. The coefﬁcients on both mobile phone coverage and the
presence of private cassava processors are statistically signiﬁcant at
1%, suggesting the relevance of the instruments.
4.2. Effects on adoption and welfare outcomes
Table 3 reports treatment effect estimates for extension access
and cooperative membership using alternative estimation tech-
niques. Columns 1 and 2 present treatment effects of extension
access based on PSM and IPWRA speciﬁcations. The third column,
which is our preferred speciﬁcation, presents ESR results. Similarly,
columns 4 and 5 present the treatment effects of cooperative
membership based on PSM and IPWRA speciﬁcations while the last
column presents the effect of cooperative membership using ESR
approach. In general, the reported effects of extension access and
cooperative membership are robust across all estimation strategies,
showing the important role of extension access and cooperative
membership on technology adoption and welfare outcome in-
dicators. In particular, we found that extension access increases the
probability of adopting improved cassava varieties by 15.5% using
PSM and 20.7% using the IPWRA speciﬁcations. Similarly, cooper-
ative membership increases the probability of adopting improved
cassava varieties by about 13% both in the PSM and IPWRA speci-
ﬁcations. In our ESR model, where we accounted for both observ-
able and unobservable sources of bias, the effect of extension access
and cooperative membership is 12.3% and 13.7%, respectively.
These results underscore that public investment that aims at
improving extension coverage and cooperative membership can
have a signiﬁcant effect on adoption of improved cassava varieties.
In addition to effects on adoption of improved cassava varieties,
Table 3 also presents the effect of extension access and cooperative
membership on household welfare (PPI, asset ownership and per-
capita food expenditure). Reported results in Table 3 suggest that
both extension access and cooperative membership have a positive
and statistically signiﬁcant effect on household welfare indicators.
The direction and magnitude of estimated effects are also consis-
tent across all speciﬁcations. For instance, the impact of extension
access on food consumption ranges from 9.5% in the IPWRA model
to 25.6% in the ESR model. These results are consistent with esti-
mates reported by Dercon et al. (2009) for Ethiopia. In addition, the
effects of extension access on asset ownership and on PPI score are
found to be positive and signiﬁcant across all speciﬁcations. This
ﬁnding is compelling as it can be used as an additional robustness
check for the validity of PPI. The consistent positive and signiﬁcant
effect of extension access on asset ownership, food expenditure and
PPI score across all speciﬁcations underlines the crucial role that
investment in public extension system may play in improving the
welfare of rural poor farm households. Coming to the effect of co-
operatives on household welfare, results are largely similar to that
of extension access. For example, the effect of cooperative mem-
bership on PPI score ranges from 4.6 points in the PSM speciﬁcation
to 9.0 points in the ESR estimates. Moreover, we found statistically
Fig. 3. Heterogeneity of treatment effects over the propensity score.
Table 5
Heterogeneous treatment effects of extension.
Variables Log asset value Adoption PPI score
Household size 0.147*** 0.000 2.390***
(0.038) (0.011) (0.413)
Age 0.003 0.011 0.950**
(0.039) (0.011) (0.420)
Age^ 2 0.000 0.000 0.007*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
Education 0.025 0.002 1.434***
(0.017) (0.005) (0.182)
Marital status 0.443 0.149 6.277
(0.371) (0.107) (4.015)
sex 0.374 0.011 2.913
(0.370) (0.106) (4.001)
TLU 0.004 0.008 0.250
(0.034) (0.010) (0.368)
Land size 0.021 0.007 0.016
(0.022) (0.006) (0.237)
Access to credit 0.142 0.016 7.076***
(0.166) (0.048) (1.791)
Distance from market 0.015 0.008* 0.088
(0.015) (0.004) (0.166)
N 792 792 792
The dependent variable is the ATT of each respective outcome indicators. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. * Signiﬁcance at the 10% level. ** Signiﬁcance at
the 5% level. *** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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asset ownership and food expenditure. These consistent positive
impacts of cooperative membership on alternative welfare in-
dicators and adoption imply that addressing output and input
market inefﬁciencies through cooperatives can improve the well-
being of rural poor farmers.
Since the reliability of PSM and IPWR results depends on the
quality of our matching, we present the extent of overall covariate
balancing and the overlap over the common support. The overall
covariate balancing test (Table 4) shows that the standardized
mean difference for all covariates used in the PSM reduces from
13.6% pre-matching to 4.2% post-matching for extension access.
Similarly, the mean standardized bias reduces from 11.5% to 6% for
cooperative membership. Moreover, the joint signiﬁcance of all
covariates was never rejected before matching for both extension
access and cooperative membership (p>c2 ¼ 0.000). However, the
likelihood ratio tests indicate that the joint signiﬁcance of all
covariates can be rejected after matching (p>c2 ¼ 0.332 for
extension access and p>c2 ¼ 0.238 for cooperative membership).
The low mean standardized bias and joint insigniﬁcance of the
covariates are indicative of successful balancing of the distribution
of covariates between treated and untreated households.
In addition, Fig. 1 presents the common support region for
extension access and Fig. 2 for cooperative membership. A visual
inspection of the distribution of the estimated propensity scores for
households with andwithout treatment indicates that the common
support condition is satisﬁed.4.3. Heterogeneous treatment effects
4.3.1. Heterogeneous treatment effect over propensity scores
Fig. 3 shows how the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT) of PPI scores and asset values vary over the estimated pro-
pensity scores. The results indicate that the ATT on the PPI score
varies signiﬁcantly with the propensity score and that the slope is
positive for both extension access and cooperative membership.
This result suggests that the effect of extension access on the PPI
score is stronger for households with the highest propensity to
have extension access. The effect of cooperativemembership on the
PPI score also increases with the propensity of cooperative
membership.
The bottom two ﬁgures (Fig. 3) present the estimated average
asset values over the estimated propensity score. The results indi-
cate that the ATT on asset value exhibits a signiﬁcant variationwiththe propensity score and asset ownership and the probability of
extension access have a negative correlation. However, the ATT on
asset values exhibits a smaller variation with the propensity score
and the correlation is positive.4.3.2. Heterogeneous effects of extension access over household
characteristics
The previous results on the ATT of extension access on outcome
indicators highlighted the important role that extension accessmay
play in rural livelihoods. However, the estimated ATTs of extension
access on welfare outcome indicators can differ among different
sets of farm households. Capturing the differential effect of exten-
sion access is therefore important for targeting individual farm
households as well as for designing “best-ﬁt” extension systems
instead of “one size ﬁts all” extension approaches. In this section, we
present the heterogeneous treatment effect of extension access
across various household characteristics in terms of technology
adoption and welfare outcomes. Following Verhofstadt and
Maertens (2014), we used ATT of individual outcome indicators as
a dependent variable in an OLS regression and examined how the
estimated ATT may vary with the socio-economic characteristics of
farmers. Results are reported in Table 5. (see Table 6)
The estimated results show that extension access has hetero-
geneous effects only to a limited extent. Only household size was
signiﬁcant for the asset ownership indicator, showing that exten-
sion access exerts a higher effect for farmers with a larger family
size. In terms of adoption of improved cassava varieties, we found
no statistically signiﬁcant differential effects, except for distance
from the market. Finally, with regard to the PPI score, we found a
statistically signiﬁcant differential effect of access to extension
services among treated households with respect to household size,
age, education, and access to credit. These results emphasize the
fact that households with better access to credit and where the
heads aremore educated beneﬁt most from extension services. This
implies that expanding rural ﬁnancial markets and schooling can
maximize the potential impact of extension access on household
welfare.
Table 6
Heterogeneous treatment effects of cooperative membership.
Variables Log asset value Adoption PPI score
Household size 0.109** 0.002 2.394***
(0.045) (0.013) (0.490)
Age 0.116** 0.008 1.217**
(0.046) (0.013) (0.506)
Age 2^ 0.001** 0.000 0.009**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Education 0.028 0.006 0.888***
(0.021) (0.006) (0.231)
Marital status 0.187 0.051 4.377
(0.435) (0.125) (4.729)
sex 0.048 0.043 3.324
(0.421) (0.121) (4.582)
TLU 0.009* 0.002 0.019
(0.005) (0.002) (0.059)
Land size 0.014 0.003 0.127
(0.026) (0.008) (0.286)
Access to credit 0.159 0.177*** 1.645
(0.212) (0.061) (2.302)
Distance from market 0.007 0.009* 0.231
(0.017) (0.005) (0.190)
N 520 520 520
The dependant variable is the ATT of each respective outcome indicators. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. * Signiﬁcance at the 10% level. ** Signiﬁcance at
the 5% level. *** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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characteristics
ATT estimates of cooperative membership reported in Table 3
assume homogenous impact of membership for all cooperative
members. However, previous studies have shown that the effect of
cooperative membership can be heterogeneous within members
(Abebaw and Haile, 2013; Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014; Ma and
Abdulai. 2016). Herein, we follow the same procedure to examine
the existence of heterogeneous treatment effects of cooperative
membership across various household characteristics in terms of
technology adoption and welfare outcomes (Table 8). The results
show that the impact of cooperative membership on asset owner-
ship is not the same for all members. In particular, we found sta-
tistically signiﬁcant and positive effects of cooperative membership
for households with larger family size and for older household
heads. The impact of cooperative membership on the likelihood of
adoption for members differs based on the level of credit access
among cooperative members. In particular, our result suggests that
the impact is stronger for households with access to credit. While
examining the heterogeneous treatment effect on PPI, we ﬁnd that
cooperative membership has the highest impact for older andmore
educated members. Interestingly, cooperative membership en-
hances the welfare (PPI scores) of less wealthy members more
strongly than those of wealthier members (using TLU as a proxy for
wealth). The emergences of grassroots institutions such as co-
operatives can therefore be an important policy instruments for
reducing income inequality in rural Nigeria.5. Conclusion
Using unique household level data from rural Nigeria, this paper
has examined the potential impacts of institutional arrangements
in the form of extension access and cooperative membership on the
adoption of improved cassava varieties and household welfare. In
doing so, this paper provides both empirical and methodological
contributions. Empirically, the paper has addressed the role ofinstitutions in addressing information market imperfections
(extension access) and inputeoutput market imperfections (co-
operatives). In particular, the analysis undertaken in this paper
underscored that both extension access and cooperative member-
ship have heterogenous effects and understanding the potential
roles of such heterogeneity is key to improve agricultural produc-
tivity. The paper underscored the importance of designing “best ﬁt”
interventions instead of “one size ﬁts all” options by capturing
essential heterogeneity among smallholders. Methodologically, the
paper goes beyond exploratory studies that establish only “corre-
lations”. In particular, this paper uses an endogenous switching
regression approach to provide causally interpretable results.
Our main results using the endogenous switching regression
approach are summarized as follows: First, we found consistently
positive and statistically signiﬁcant effects of extension access and
cooperative membership on technology adoption and household
welfare. For instance, extension access enhances the adoption of
improved cassava varieties by up to 12.3%. Similarly, the effect of
extension access on PPI score reaches as high as 10 points. Our
analysis further shows that cooperative membership increases the
likelihood of adoption by about 22%. We also found that coopera-
tive membership increases the PPI score by about 9 points.
Secondly, both access to extension and cooperative membership
have heterogeneous effects over the propensity score of getting
access to extension and joining a cooperative as well as other key
household characteristics. In particular, we found a positive rela-
tionship between the ATT of welfare outcomes and propensity
scores for extension access. This result implies that the effect of
extension access is stronger for households with the highest pro-
pensity to have extension access. The treatment effect of extension
access on asset ownership also depends on some household char-
acteristics, such as formal credit access, education level and
household size. We also found differential impacts of extension
access with respect to credit access, education, household size, age,
and land size for the ATT on PPI score. The consistent positive and
signiﬁcant effect of credit access on these outcome indicators imply
that expanding rural ﬁnancial markets can maximize the potential
impact of extension access on household welfare and technology
adoption. We also found that the beneﬁcial impact of cooperative
membership is stronger for more educated members. In addition,
there is differential impact of cooperative membership conditional
on household wealth, with stronger and positive effects on rela-
tively poorer members than on wealthier members. A key policy
implication of these differential impacts is that the positive impacts
of extension and cooperative services on farmers’ productivity and
welfare could be reinforced if, for instance, rural ﬁnancial markets
and schools expand.
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Endogenous switching regression estimates on asset ownership
Variables Asset value
Selection With extension Without extension
Household size 0.041 0.491*** 0.649***
(0.067) (0.116) (0.113)
Age 0.029** 0.052** 0.049**
(0.015) (0.0258) (0.0246)
Age^ 2 0.0002 0.00026 0.00023
(0.00013) (0.00024) (0.0002)
Education 0.022*** 0.063*** 0.063***
(0.0066) (0.011) (0.012)
Marital status 0.104 0.105 0.094
(0.14) (0.244) (0.229)
Sex 0.047 0.318 0.425*
(0.138) (0.240) (0.228)
TLU 0.037*** 0.096*** 0.046**
(0.011) (0.018) (0.019)
Land size 0.02** 0.0055 0.003
(0.0097) (0.014) (0.0156)
Access to credit 0.234*** 0.147 0.084
(0.063) (0.115) (0.123)
Use of chemical
fertilizer
0.055 0.093 0.0009
(0.07) (0.119) (0.0047)
Distance from herbicide
market
0.0066** 0.0019 0.005
(0.00296) (0.0054) (0.0048)
Cassava steam market 0.056 0.177 0.051
(0.076) (0.121) (0.131)
Mobile phone coverage 0.213***
(0.096)
si 0.392
*** 0.574***
(0.0351) (0.031)
rj 0.33
** 0.27
(0.132) (0.183)
N 2090 815 1275
si denotes the square-root of the variance of the error terms in the outcome equations. rj denotes the correlation coefﬁcient between the error term of the selection equation
and the error term of the outcome equations. * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Table 8
Endogenous switching regression estimates for PPI score
Variables PPI score
Selection Cooperative members Non-members
Household size 0.024* 0.045*** 0.038***
(0.0139) (0.0078) (0.0045)
Age 0.0116 0.014* 0.009**
(0.014) (0.0079) (0.004)
Age^ 2 0.00013 0.00012* 0.00007*
(0.00013) (0.00007) (0.00004)
Education 0.026*** 0.0045 0.022***
(0.0063) (0.0037) (0.002)
Marital status 0.043 0.0064 0.08**
(0.128) (0.072) (0.039)
Sex 0.1225 0.027 0.014
(0.129) (0.071) (0.041)
TLU 0.0032 0.001 0.00009
(0.003) (0.0012) (0.0025)
Land size 0.031** 0.0097** 0.007**
(0.009) (0.0049) (0.003)
Access to credit 0.209*** 0.147 0.084
(0.041) (0.115) (0.123)
Distance from herbicide market 0.0008 0.0002 0.00004
(0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0009)
Cassava steam market 0.048 0.0043 0.0018
(0.0049) (0.0027) (0.0016)
Presence of private cassava processors 0.188***
(0.049)
si 0.617*** 1.01***
(0.044) (0.018)
rj 2.35** 0.135
Table 8 (continued )
Variables PPI score
Selection Cooperative members Non-members
(0.149) (0.095)
N 2090 564 1526
si denotes the square-root of the variance of the error terms in the outcome equations. rj denotes the correlation coefﬁcient between the error term of the selection equation
and the error term of the outcome equations. * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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